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properly pleaded, yet it is a matter not necessary to be decided at
this time, not being put in issue by the pleadings.
It is considered that the defendant Pope, by making the notes
and executing the deed of trust stated in the plea, did not thereby
cause the release and discharge of Stonebraker from liability on the
original indebtedness, and the demurrer, is therefore sustained.
NOTES OF RECENT ENGLISH LEADING CASES.
SALE OR GIFT BY CLIENT TO SOLICITOR.
Tomson vs. Judge, 3 Drew, 306.
"It may be regarded," says Professor Parsons on Contr., vol. i.,
p. 47, "as a prevailing principle of the law, that an agent must
.not put himself in a position which is adverse to that of his princi-
pal." This rule is fully recognized and sternly acted upon in the
Telation of solicitor and client, and has been recently and emphati-
tally enunciated in the case on which the following note, taken
from the London Law Magazine, for February, 1856, is founded.
"As to the cases of purchases by solicitors from their clients,
,there is no rule of this court," observed Vice-Chancellor Sir R.
'Kindersley, in the present case, "to the effect that a solicitor can-
not make such a purchase. A solicitor can purchase his client's
property, even while the relation subsists; but the rule of the court
-is that such purchases are to be viewed with great jealousy, and the
onus lies on the solicitor to show that the transaction was perfectly
fair; that the client knew what he was doing, and in particular
that a fair price was given, and of course that no kind of advantage
was taken by the solicitor. If the solicitor shows that the transac-
tion was fair and clear, there is no difference between a purchase
by him and by a stranger." In this case, the evidence showed that
Chamberlayne, the client, was on terms of great friendship with
Judge, the solicitor ; that he had induced Judge to commence prac-
tice in the neighborhood where he lived, by promises of support and
patronage; and that some months before his death he executed a
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deed of conveyance to Judge, which was expressed to be in consid-
eration of 100 for the purchase-money, and contained the usual
receipt and covenant for title. The only evidence, independent of
the deed, was that of Judge himself. He said that the transaction
was never meant as a purchase, but as a gift, and that the consid-
eration was merely nominal, no money having passed. Judge
himself acted in the matter as solicitor, and no other was employed.
The property had cost the client £1,200, and was admitted to
be worth that sum at the least. It was urged on behalf of Judge that
it was intended as a gift, and that the intention of bounty being
clearly proved, it would not be disregarded because there was on
the deed a statement not strictly consistent; and, further, that the
relation between the parties here was not that of a mere solicitor
and client, but that of a patron and prot6g6, Chamberlayne having
placed himself quasi in loco parentis. Having stated the rule of
the court as above, in respect of purchases by solicitors from their
clients, the Vice-Chancellor proceeds: "Is the rule with regard to
gifts precisely the same, or is it more stringent? Less stringent it
cannot be. There is this obvious distinction between a gift and a
purchase. In the case of a purchase the parties are at arms'
length, and each party requires from the other the full value of that
which he gives in return. In the case of a gift the matter is totally
different, and it appears to me that there is a far stricter rule estab-
lished in this court than with regard to purchases, and that the rule
of this court makes such transaction, that is of a gift from the client to
the solicitor, absolutely invalid. To this distinction Lord Justice Tur-
ner refers in Hfolman vs. Loy/nes, 18 Jur. 889, when he says, 'The
rules against gifts are absolute, and against purchases they are
modified."' His honor referred to Welles vs. Middleton, (1 Cox,
112,) Hatch vs. Jatch, (9 Yes. 292,) Lady Ormonde vs. ffutckin-
son, (18 Ves. 47,) and - vs. Downes, (18 Yes. 127,) as sup-
porting the doctrine enunciated by him. The rule being thus clear
and unambiguous, the only question that can be fairly discussed in
cases similar to the present, is what constitutes the relation of soli-
citor and client; what number of transactions-and for how long a
time-and how shortly before the particular transaction which has
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been impeached-are sometimes important considerations. In this
case, it was not attempted to be denied that the relation of solicitor
and client, which had subsisted for years before the dealing com-
plained of, continued to subsist throughout it, and down to the
death of Chamberlayne. Judge was therefore declared a trustee
for the plaintiff in the suit, which was for administration.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
Fletcher v. Tayleur, 17 C. B. 21.'
The measure of damages on breach of contract to manufacture
a chattel, is prima fac.ie the difference between the market value of
the chattel and the price to e paid. 2 Greenl. on Evid., § 261;
Waters vs. Towers, 8 Exch. 401 ; Struthers vs. Woolston, 5 W. & S.
106.
The action in this case was brought to recover damages for the
breach of a contract for the building and delivery of a ship, which
ought, under such contract, to have been delivered on the 1st of
August, 1854, but was not, in fact, delivered until March, 1855.
The vessel was intended by the plaintiffs-and from the nature
of her fittings the defendant must have known the fact-for a pas-
senger ship in the Australian trade.
The cause was tried at the last Liverpool Assizes, before Crow-
der, J., who, referring to Hadley vs. Baxendale, (9 Exch. 841,)
directed the jury in regard to the proper measure of damages in
these terms, that "where two parties have made a contract which
one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought
to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as
may fairly aud reasonably be considered either arising naturally,
that is, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been
in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the con-
tract, as the probable result of the breach of it." The jury, under
I London Law Magazine, for February, 1856.
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the above direction, assessed the damages at £2,750-the difference
between the net freight which the vessel probably would have earned
bad she been delivered at the time stip lated for, and the amount
actually earned by her when delivered some months later-freights
in the particular trade having ad interim considerably fallen.
A new trial having been moved for, on the ground that the
damages were excessive, was re'used, they not having been extrava-
gantly large, by the court, which likewise threw out some hints as
to the true mode of assessing damages in actions for breach of con-
tract, which are well deserving of attention. Thus, Jervis, C. J.,
remarked, that " it would be extremely convenient if there were
some general rule as to the measure of damages applicable to all
cases of breach of contract, rather than that the matter should be
left at large. May it not be that the breach of a mercantile con-
tract may be susceptible of estimation according to the avevage per
centage of mercantile profits P And Willes, J., added: "It certainly
is very desirable that these matters should be based on certain and
intelligible principles, and that the measure of damages for the
breach of a contract for the delivery of a chattel should be governed
by a similar rule to that which prevails in the case of a breach of a
contract for the payment of money. No matter what the amount
of inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff in the case of non-pay-
ment of money, the measure of damages is the interest of the money
only: and it might be a convenient rule if the measure of damages
in such a case as this was held, by analogy, to-be the average profit
made by the use of such a chattel." The method thus suggested
for measuring the damages is obviously somewhat different from
that usually adopted by the jury under circumstances similar to
those above presented, and might not improbably often conduct to
a result more satisfactory and equitable than that which could be
arrived at according to the present system. Consult Davis vs.
Shields, 24 Wend. 322; Taylor vs. Maguire, 12 Missouri, 818;
Fhiteman vs. Coates, 14 Id. 9; Furlong vs. Polleys, 80 Maine,
491; Smith vs..Dunlap, 12 Ill. 462; Johnson vs. Small, 2 Cushing,
40; Freeman vs. Clute, 8 Barb. S. 0. 424; Sugden vs. Jenkins,
8 Sandf. S. C. Rep. 614.
